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"No, you're going to hear the truth-what you are and
what I am! . . . The man don't know who we are! The man is
gonna know! We never told the truth for ten minutes in this
house!"' With these words to his parents and brother, Biff
seeks to shatter the dual world in which he has lived for so
long. The world of the Loman family consists of what actually
occurs and the very different description of those occurrences.
This duality masks not only their acts of infidelity and failure,
but also their meritorious accomplishments. Ultimately, a
destructive world full of confusion and delusion results.
Like the duality in Arthur Miller's play, duality exists in
the American Law Institute's Complex Litigation RecommendaThere is a distinct dichotomy in
tions (hereinafter "Pr~posal").~
the Proposal's treatment of the abstention doctrines, on one
page praising them and pledging allegiance to them, while on
another trivializing and summarily dismissing them. Such split
speech results, as it does in Arthur Miller's play, in confusion.
Ultimately, the valuable benefits found in the principles of
federalism underlying these doctrines may be lost.
Federal court abstention is deeply rooted in American
jurisprudence. Despite the supremacy of federal law and
judgments in areas in which these are appropriate, federal
courts are subject to significant statutory and common law
restraints that are designed to preserve the jurisdiction and
legitimacy of state courts as the guarantors of federal rights.
These restraints have largely evolved through legislative and
judicial reaction to concerns over comity and federalism. The
jurisdiction sanctioned in Ex parte Young3 and Home
Telephone & Telegraph Co. v. City of Los Angeles4 was partly
responsible for a major shift in the distribution of power
between the states and the nation.' This shift did not go
unnoticed by Congress or the federal courts! Congressional
1. ARTKURMILLER,DEATHOF A SALESMAN
130-31(Viking Press 1949).
LITIGATION:STATUTORYRECOMMENDA2. AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, COMPLEX
TIONS AND ANALYSIS(1994)[hereinafter COMPLEXLITIGATIONPROPOSAL].
3. Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908).
4. Home Telephone & Telegraph Co. v. City of Los Angeles, 227 U.S. 278
(1913).
5. PAULM. BATORET AL., HART AND WECHSLER'STHE FEDERALCOURTSAND
THE FEDERAL SYSTEM1308 (3d ed. 1988) [hereinafter HART & WECHSLER].
6. Id.
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response essentially was formulated in provisions of the
Judicial Code which required federal abstention.? These
"statutorily-dictated abstention[sIm8are embodied in the AntiInjunction Act,g the Tax Injunction Act of 1937," the Johnson
Act of 1934," the since-modified Three-Judge Court Act,12
and the exhaustion requirement in habeas corpus.13
Federal deferral to state proceedings has not been achieved
only by congressional action. The federal courts themselves
have played an important role in limiting their own
jurisdiction, not only in the realm sanctioned by Young and
Home Telephone, but also more broadly in the areas of federal
question and diversity jurisdiction. Although they have
jurisdiction, the federal courts sometimes decline its exercise to
allow for state court adjudication. This deferral is most widely
observed in the federal common law abstention doctrines.'*
This comment will address these abstention doctrines in the
broad categories of Pullman abstention, Burford abstention,
Colorado River abstention, and Younger abstention? While
the varying policies and purposes underlying these various
forms of abstention will be more closely examined in the body
of this comment, it may be noted here that a unifylng thread of

7 . Id.
8. Martin Redish, Abstention, Separation of Powers, and the Limits of the
Judicial Function, 94 YALE L.J. 71, 74 n.18 (1984).
9. 28 U.S.C. $ 2283 (1982) (prohibiting a federal court from granting an
injunction to stay proceedings in a state court "except as expressly authorized by
Act of Congress, or where necessary in aid of its jurisdiction, or to protect or
effectuate its judgments").
10. 28 U.S.C. § 1341 (1982) (limiting federal district court jurisdiction to
enjoin the assessment, levy, or collection of any tax under state law).
11. 28 U.S.C. $ 1342 (1982) (limiting federal district court jurisdiction to
enjoin state public utility rate orders).
12. 28 U.S.C. $ 2284 (1982) (requiring that a district court panel of three
judges be convened to hear actions seeking injunctive relief against allegedly
unconstitutional state statutes or administrative orders). A 1913 provision, directing
a three-judge federal district court panel to suspend its proceedings whenever a
state court stayed proceedings pending state court determination of an action to
enforce a statute or order, proved largely ineffectual and was repealed in 1976. See
Joseph C. Hutcheson, Jr., Note, A Case for Three Judges, 47 HARV. L. REV. 795,
813-25 (1934); Welch Pogue, Note, State Determination of State Law and the
Judicial Code, 41 HARV.L. REV. 623 (1928).
13. 28 U.S.C. $ 2254(b) (1982).
14. Other exceptions to the proper exercise of federal jurisdiction, such as the
doctrine of forum non conveniens, will not be addressed in this comment.
15. See 17A CHARLESA. WRIGHT
ET AL., FEDERAL
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE:
C m 2d $ 4241 (1986).
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deference by the federal courts to litigation in the state courts
connects them all.
After presenting an overview of abstention doctrines in the
federal courts, this comment will turn to the Proposal and
examine its impact, when considered as a whole, on existing
abstention doctrines and the underlying principles of
federalism. The Proposal provides for the consolidation in one
transferee court of cases previously pending in federal or state
courts whenever "they involve one or more common questions
of fact" and when "transfer and consolidation will promote the
just, efficient, and fair conduct of the actions."16 In so
providing, the Proposal professes to respect the "overriding
concern" of the "basic principles of federalism and their
implications as to the respective roles of state and federal
~ourts."'~
Additionally, the Proposal grants the federal transferee court the power to issue antisuit injunctions enjoining
"transactionally related proceedings, or portions thereof,
'~
deciding
pending in any state or federal ~ o u r t . ~ 'When
"whether an injunction should issue,"lg the comment to the
Proposal encourages the transferee judge to "respect traditional
notions of federalism, especially as reflected in the various
abstention doctrines."20
This comment concludes that the Proposal, although
superficially recognizing the importance of federalism concerns
underlying the abstention doctrines, actually undermines these
concerns through its emphasis on efficiency.

A. The Underlying Premises
When seeking to establish a system of government that
would allow both federal and state sovereignties to coexist, the
Founding Fathers naturally encountered concerns over possible
frictions between federal and state systems.21 A significant
area of concern was the judiciary.22As Justice Black observed

16. COMPLEX
LITIGATION
PROPOSAL,
supra note 2, 8 3.01(a)(l), (2).
17. Id. Ch. 1, b.
18. Id. 8 5.04(a).
19. Id. 8 5.04(b).
20. Id. 8 5.04 cmt. d.
21. Atlantic Coast Line R.R. v. Brotherhood of Locomotive Eng'rs, 98 US.
281, 285 (1970).
22. Id.
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in Atlantic Coast Line,the Founders addressed those concerns
by reserving significant powers to the States:
When this Nation was established by the Constitution, each
State surrendered only a part of its sovereign power to the
national government. But those powers that were not surrendered were retained by the States and unless a State was restrained by "the supreme Law of the Land" as expressed in
the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States, it was
free to exercise those retained powers as it saw fit. One of the
reserved powers was the maintenance of state judicial systems for the decision of legal controversies."

The federal government ensured the maintenance of state
judicial systems as well as respect for such state systems
through the Judiciary Act of 1789.~~
This Act prevented the
lower federal courts from directly reviewing cases from state
courts and authorized the Supreme Court to review the decisions of state courts on direct appeal. The beginnings of two
essentially separate legal systems thus had their genesis early
in this country's history. However, these two systems did not
exist without difficulty and fiction. As litigants sought to sue
in the system that most likely would be favorable to their
cause, it became evident that the judiciary would function neither efficiently nor effectively if the courts of both systems
"were free to fight each other for control of a particular case.
Thus, in order to make the dual system work and 'to prevent
needless friction between state and federal courts,' . . . it was
necessary to work out lines of demarcation between the two
systems ."25
Several of these "lines of demarcation" were enumerated in
the 1789
Other lines were drawn through subsequent
legislation. There are three principal statutorily-dictated limits
which prevent the state and federal judicial systems from
"fighting over" control of a particular case.27These are briefly

23. Id.
24. Act of Sept. 24, 1789, 1 Stat. 73.
25. Atlantic Coast Line, 398 U.S. at 286 (quoting Oklahoma Packing Co. v.
Oklahoma Gas & Elec. Co., 309 U.S. 4, 9 (1940)).
26. See, e.g., Act of Sept. 24, 1789, $5 9, 11, 13, 1 Stat. 73.
27. The statutory branch of the habeas corpus exhaustion requirement, 28
U.S.C. $ 2254(b) (1982), and the Three-Judge Court Act, 28 U.S.C. $ 2284 (1982),
will be omitted from this discussion as their relation to the instant topic is tangential at best.
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treated here to provide a foundation for analysis of the judicially created lines of demarcation.

1. The Anti-Injunction Act
The Anti-Injunction Act prohibits a federal court from
granting "an injunction to stay proceedings in a State court
except as expressly authorized by Act of Congress, or where
necessary in aid of its jurisdiction, or to protect or effectuate its
judgments."28Commentators have argued that the true intent
of this Act, originally passed in 1793 and broadly revised in
1948, was to authorize sound judicial discretion in protecting
the federal courts and the exercise of their subject matter jurisdiction.29However, the exceptions within the Anti-Injunction
Act have been construed narrowly by the Supreme Court.30
The Anti-Injunction Act was passed and revised on the
assumption that duplicative federal and state proceedings are
permi~sible.~'
'Staying proceedings," for the purposes of this
Act, includes enforcing state judgments and enjoining litigants
from proceeding in state court.32 Enjoining litigants from beginning state proceedings is not covered by the Act since no
state "proceedings" then exist."
28. 28 U.S.C. $ 2283 (1982).
29. William T. Mayton, Ersatz Federalism Under the Anti-Injunction Statute,
78 COLUM.L. REV. 330 (1978); see also Comment, Federal Court Stays of State
Court Proceedings: A Reexamination of Original Congressional Intent, 38 U. CHI. L.
REV. 612, 613 (1971) ("Congress in 1793 did not intend to prevent stays effected by
writs other than injunction, and that Congress specifically approved the use of the
[common-law] writ of certiorari to stay state proceedings."). This view of the AntiInjunction Act seems to support the "implied delegation rationale" justifying the
judicially-created abstention doctrines. See infh part II.B.5.
30. See generally Chick Kam Choo v. Exxon Corp, 486 U.S. 140, 148 (1987)
(urging a strict and narrow interpretation); South Carolina v. Regan, 465 U.S. 367,
377 11.14 (1984); Atlantic Coast Line R.R. v. Brotherhood of Locomotive Eng'rs, 398
U.S. 281, 287 (1970) (holding ban of injunctions is absolute unless the case falls
within one of the three express exceptions); Alton Box Bd. Co. v. Esprit De Corp,
682 F.2d 1267, 1272 (9th Cir. 1988); Comment, T m o Inc. v. Pennzoil: Some
Thoughts on the Limits of Federal Court Power Over State Court Proceedings, 54
FORDHAML. REV. 767, 796 (1986) (noting that the Younger court "overturned the
federally issued injunction . . . without reaching the question of whether $ 1983
was an expressly authorized exception to the Anti-Injunction Act").
31. Stanton v. Embrey, 93 U.S. 548, 554 (1877); see also Kline v. Burke
Constr. Co., 260 US. 226, 230 (1922) (holding that "[elach court is free to proceed
in its own way and in its own time, without reference to the proceedings in the
other court").
32. Lynch v. Household Fin. Corp., 405 US. 538, 555 (1972).
33. Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380 U.S. 479, 484 n.2 (1965); Ex parte Young, 209
U.S. 123 (1908); Roth v. Bank of the Commonwealth, 583 F.2d 527 (6th Cir. 1978),
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To fall within the Act's "expressly authorized" exception,
an act of Congress either must explicitly authorize such an
exception or create a federal right or remedy which cannot be
enjoyed fully or protected completely without a stay of a state
court proceeding." Federal civil rights cases, for example,
meet the standard of the "expressly authorized exception";
similarly, 42 U.S.C. 8 1983 has been held to expressly authoThus the whole
rize an injunction of state pro~eedings.~~
range of state criminal proceedings is, in theory, subject to a
potential federal injunction, which in turn has led to the tendency to narrowly construe the various abstention doctrines in
order to permit the state courts to proceed.
The "protect or effectuate its judgments," or relitigation,
exception authorizes a federal court which has already entered
a binding judgment on an issue to enjoin state proceedings
seeking an inconsistent result.36 Entitlement to an injunction
under this exception turns on the preclusive effect of the federal decree.37Issue preclusion triggers the relitigation exception.
However, despite language in Chick Kam Choo v. Exxon
carp.38 urging a "strict and narrow'' interpretation applicable
only to "claims or issues which . . . actually have been decided
by the federal court,"39there is a split of authority among the

cert. dismissed, 442 U.S. 925 (1979); McSurely v. Ratliff, 282 F. Supp. 848, 853
(E.D. Ky. 1967), appeal dismissed, 390 U.S. 412 (1968); cf. Hicks v. Miranda, 422
U.S. 332, 347-48 (1975) (holding that where criminal defendants had been charged
and contraband "had been declared to be obscene and seizable by the Superior
Court," a federal order returning contraband seized in preparation for state criminal prosecution "interfered with the pending criminal prosecution," which was considered "pending" despite the fact that "no state criminal proceedings [had been
brought] against appellees by name"); Brooks v. Briley, 274 F. Supp. 538, 553
(M.D. Tenn. 19671, aff'd, 391 U.S. 361 (1968) (holding that arrest and issue of a
warrant constitute "proceedings" and thus could be enjoined).
34. Mitchum v. Foster, 407 U.S. 225, 236 (1972).
35. Id.
36. United States v. International Bd. of Teamsters, 907 F.2d 277, 280-81 (2d
Cir. 1990) (affirming injunction barring collateral lawsuits by non-parties to consent
decree in any other forum where such actions posed significant risk of subjecting
consent decree to inconsistent interpretations); Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenberg Bd.
of Educ., 501 F.2d 383, 384 (4th Cir. 1974) (noting the possibility of conflicting
orders from state and federal courts sufficient to warrant injunctive relief against
state court under Anti-Injunction Act).
37. Huguley v. General Motors Corp., 52 F.3d 1364, 1370 (6th Cir. 1995)
(examining whether state claims fall within preclusive effect of prior federal judgment).
38. 486 U.S. 140 (1988).
39. Id. a t 148.
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circuits as to whether claim preclusion also triggers the
relitigation e~ception.~'
The "necessary in aid of jurisdiction" exception applies
when "some federal injunctive relief may be necessary to prevent a state court from so interfering with a federal court's
consideration or disposition of a case as to seriously impair the
federal court's flexibility and authority to decide that case."41
There are several cases applying this exception to prevent
interference with the settlement of complex l i t i g a t i ~ n . ~ ~
2.

The Johnson Act

~
The Johnson Act of 1 9 3 4 ~prohibits
federal district courts
from enjoining state public utility rate orders if all four of the
following criteria are satisfied:
Jurisdiction is based solely on diversity of citizenship or
repugnance of the order to the Federal Constitution; and,
The order does not interfere with interstate commerce;
and
The order has been made aRer reasonable notice and
hearing; and,
A plain, speedy and efficient remedy may be had in the
courts of such State?

3. The Tax Injunction Act

Congress limited federal district court jurisdiction over a
second major subject matter through the Tax Injunction Act of
1 9 3 7 . ~This
~ legislation was enacted, as was the Johnson Act,
in response to what was viewed as an unwarranted expansion
of federal jurisdiction in the aftermath of Ex Parte Young.46
This Act restricts federal district court jurisdiction to enjoin
40. See Western Sys., Inc. v. Ulloa, 958 F.2d 864 (9th Cir. 1992) (discussing
the differences between the circuits).
41. Atlantic Coast Line R.R. v. Brotherhood of Locomotive Eng'rs, 398 U.S.
281, 295 (1970).
42. See Carlough v. AMCHEM Prods., Inc., 10 F.3d 189, 204 (3d Cir. 1993)
(finding injunction appropriate where prospect of settlement was imminent in asbestos class action); Lou v. Belzberg, 834 F.2d 730, 740 (9th Cir. 1987) (recognizing
propriety of injunction "where the state proceedings would impair seriously pending
settlements").
43. 28 U.S.C. § 1342 (1982).
44. Id.
45. 28 U.S.C. § 1341 (1982).
46. HART & WECHSLER,supra note 5, at 1339.
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"the assessment, levy or collection of any tax under State law"
if "a plain, speedy and efficient remedy may be had in the
courts of such State."" The key element prohibiting an injunction under the Johnson Act and the Tax-Injunction Act is the
availability of a plain, efficient, and speedy remedy in the state
The Supreme Court has stated that the exceptions
under the Tax Injunction Act "must [be] construed narrowly"
and the Court will often bend over backwards to find state
remedies adequate.4g

B. The Judicial Abstention Doctrines and
Their Underlying Policies
I . Pullman abstention
The first of the judicially-created abstention doctrines was
crafted by the Supreme Court in the Pullman case?' The complaint of the African-American Pullman porters alleged that an
order from the Texas Railroad Commission requiring conductors (who were white) to be in charge of sleeping cars discriminated against African-Americans in violation of the Fourteenth
A m e n d ~ n e n t The
. ~ ~ Supreme Court required the lower federal
court to abstain from deciding the case until a state court settled uncertain state law issues.52 The basis for the decision
was the policy of avoidance of unnecessary decisions of constitutional questions.53Justice Frankfurter added that the "exercise of wise discretion" justified a restraint of authority "because of 'scrupulous regard for the rightful independence of the
state governments' and for the smooth working of the federal
judiciary," and because
[flew public interests have a higher claim upon the discretion
of a federal chancellor than the avoidance of needless friction
with state policies. . . . This use of equitable powers is a contribution of the courts in furthering the harmonious relation

47. Id.
48. Spector Motor Service, Inc. v. O'Connor, 340 U.S. 602 (1951).
49. California v. Grace Brethren Church, 457 U.S. 393, 413 (1982); see
Rosewell v. LaSalle Nat'l Bank, 450 U.S. 503 (1981) (finding a state remedy adequate when plaintiff alleged property assessment at more than 300% the statutory
limit and despite a usual two-year delay in tax refund actions).
50. Railroad Comm'n v. Pullman Co., 312 U.S. 496 (1941).
51. Id. at 497.
52. Id. at 500.
53. Id. at 498.
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between state and federal authority without the need of rigorous congressional restriction of those powers.54

While these federalism concerns were only briefly mentioned in Pullman, the Supreme Court expounded upon them
in Louisiana Power & Light Co. v. City of T h i b o d a ~ x The
.~~
Court "made explicit what was only suggested in Pullman,
namely, that the one type of federal-state friction abstention
seeks to avoid results from erroneous state law decisions by
federal courts. Apparently, because state and federal litigants
receive disparate treatment, such error creates friction by preventing uniform application of state law."56
Thus was born the rule of Pullman abstention: when there
is a federal constitutional issue whose presentation might be
avoided or significantly altered5' by resolution of an uncertain
state law question:8 the federal court should abstain.59
2. Burford abstention

Another form of abstention-Burford abstention-arose to
address considerations of comity when issues of state law ap-

54. Id. at 500-01 (citations omitted).
55. 360 U.S. 25 (1959).
56. James C. Rehnquist, Taking Comity Seriously: How to Neutralize the Abstention Doctrine, 46 STAN.L. REV. 1049, 1081 (1994) (citations omitted).
57. Long Island Lighting Co. v. Cuomo, 666 F. Supp. 370, 401 (N.D.N.Y.
1987) ("[Tlhe state law must be susceptible of an interpretation that . . . would
materially alter the nature of the constitutional questions raised.").
58. Wisconsin v. Constantineau, 400 U.S. 433, 439 (1971) (holding that the
state statute must contain ambiguity).
59. Houston v. Hill, 482 U.S. 451, 468 (1987); Harman v. Forssenies, 380
U.S. 528, 534-35 (1965). Subsequent cases also require an examination of other
factors, such as whether injunctive relief is sought against state officials based on
state law, see Pennhurst State School & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 106
(1984), whether an adequate state remedy is available to the plaintiff, see
Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380 U.S. 479, 484-86 (1965), and whether a single state
proceeding is likely to resolve the dispute, see Baggett v. Bullitt, 377 U.S. 360,
378-79 (1964); see also Virginia v. American Booksellers Ass'n, 484 U.S. 383, 395
(1988) (stating that if 'the state will decline to defend a statute if it is read one
way and where the nature and substance of plaintiffs' constitutional challenge is
drastically altered if the statute is read another way, it is essential [to have] the
benefit of the law's authoritative construction from then state court); City of Houston v. Hill, 482 US. 451 (1987), appeal dismissed, cert. denied, 483 US. 1001
(1987) (holding that abstention was not appropriate in a civil rights case where the
need for immediate federal intervention existed). But see Georgevich v. Strauss, 772
F.2d 1078, 1094 (3d Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1028 (1988) (holding that if
full and effective relief can be granted by the state court, the "possibility of delay
alone" does not prohibit abstention).

DEATH OF A DOCTRINE?
pear to be peculiar and unique, such as with natural resources,
and when the state has created administrative schemes to deal
with such issues.60Burford was an action seeking a federal
injunction against a Texas Railroad Commission order which
granted a neighboring leaseholder a permit to drill new
wells? Burford invoked both federal question and diversity
jurisdi~tion.~~
Texas had provided that all cases involving
drilling rights were to be handled by one state court in order to
prevent inconsistencies and confusion.63The Supreme Court
held that the action should have been dismissed because of the
presence of unique state interests in gas and oil, as well as a
scheme of public administration equipped with a unified system of review to ensure consistent interpretation and implementation of state policy.64
Burford abstention in a diversity case involving uncertain
state law and important state interests and policies is generally
inappropriate unless the interests are peculiar and unique,
such as eminent domain or water rights.65New Orleans Public
Service Inc. v. Council of City of New Orleans66 (NOPSI)
served to clarify this by holding that the focus in applying
Burford abstention was to be on federalism concerns and that
abstention should be ordered only when significant questions of
local law or policy transcending the case at bar are implicated.67
This federalism focus is clear from the majority's opinion in
NOPSI, which explained that the case was properly dismissed
by the lower court because the dispute "so clearly involve[d]
basic problems of Texas policy that equitable discretion should
be exercised to give the Texas courts the first opportunity to

60. Burford v. Sun Oil Co., 319 U.S. 315 (1943).
61. Id. at 316-17.
62. Id. at 317.
63. Id. at 326.
64. Id. at 333.
65. See Kaiser Steel Corp. v. W.S. Ranch Co., 391 U.S. 593 (1968); Louisiana
Power & Light Co. v. City of Thibodaux, 360 U.S. 25 (1959). But cf. County of
Allegheny v. Frank Mashuda Co., 360 U.S. 185 (1959) (stating that a federal court
must exercise diversity jurisdiction if properly invoked in a state eminent domain
case). See generally Meredith v. Winter Haven, 320 US. 228, 236-38 (1943) (reviewing numerous applications of abstention when federal law turns on interpretation of local law).
66. 491 US. 350 (1989).
67. Id. at 361-64; see also Colorado River Water Cons. Dist. v. United States,
424 U.S. 800, 814-15 (1976) (discussing the requirement that there be significant
questions of local law or policy for Burford abstention to be appropriate).
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consider them? The exercise of equitable discretion would
prevent federal-state "friction," especially, emphasized Justice
Douglas in concurrence, friction "generated by the federal
court's continuous and hovering presence as an additional
policymaking player in the Texas regulatory regime."69Justice
Douglas noted that the Texas courts
may at times be the senior and dominant member of [the
federallstate court] partnership if they perform the h c t i o n s
which Texas law places on them. The courts do not sit merely
to enforce rights based on orders of the state administrative
agency. They sit in judgment on that agency. That, to me, is
the crux of the matter. If the federal courts undertook to sit
in review, so to speak, of this state administrative agency,
they would in effect actively participate in the fashioning of
the state's domestic policy. That interference would be a continuing one, as the opinion of the Court points out. Moreover,
divided authority would result. Divided authority breeds friction. . . .70

As Douglas's statements indicate, the federalism concerns in
Burford were an overriding factor in the .NOPSI decision.
Interestingly, a recent case demonstrates the continued
vigor, or at least the minor renaissance,?' of Burford abstention. In 1990, the Supreme Court held in TaffZin v. ~ e v i t t ? ~
that since Congress was not unmistakably clear in subverting
the heavy presumption of dual court sovereignty, the state
courts have not been divested of their jurisdiction over civil
RICO claims.73This characterization caused the Court to conclude that the federal courts are not required to hear these
cases but may invoke Burford abstention in appropriate case~.?~

68. Burford, 319 US. a t 332.
69. Id. at 335 (Douglas, J., concurring).
70. Id.
71. The Hart and Wechsler text points out that the "Supreme Court has not
invoked Burford abstention since" Alabama Public Service Commission v. Southern
supra note 5, at 1364.
Railroad, 341 U.S. 341 (1951). HART & WESCHLER,
72. 493 U.S. 455 (1990).
73. Id. at 459.
74. Id. a t 458; see also Law Enforcement Ins. Co. v. Corcoran, 807 F.2d 38
(2d Cir. 1986); Roy v. Verchereau, 619 I?. Supp. 1323 (D. Vt. 1985) (stating that
labor disputes are an excellent example of local problems in which federal intervention is inappropriate).
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3. Younger abstention
It will be recalled that under the Anti-Injunction Act75a
federal court may enjoin a state court proceeding when, inter
alia, Congress expressly permits an injunction. Additionally,
Mitchum v. FosterT6held that Congress intended $ 1983 actions to be exceptions to the Anti-Injunction Act, thus granting
the federal courts the constitutional and statutory power to
enjoin state proceeding^.^^ It is generally in a situation such
as this, in which the plaintiff seeks to enjoin a state proceeding
based on the unconstitutionality of state law, that Younger
abstention is applied.78
In Younger v. ~ a r r i s "the Supreme Court encountered a
plaintiff charged under a California law which was alleged to
be constitutionally defective?' The plaintiff sought an injunction in federal court against his criminal prosecution under
this allegedly unconstitutional law?' Although the district
court enjoined the state proceeding, the High Court reversed,
calling the injunction "a violation of the national policy forbidding federal courts to stay or enjoin pending state court proceedings except under special ~ircumstances."~~
Thus, Younger abstention prevents a federal court, even in
an effort to protect federal constitutional rights, from enjoining
a pending state criminal proceeding. However, notwithstanding
Younger, if there is bad faith hara~srnent,'~
such as repeated
prosecution without any valid ground, or if a proceeding or
statute is flagrantly and patently violative of express constitutional prohibitions," or if there are other extraordinary circ u m s t a n c e ~an
,~~
injunction may issue.
75. 28 U.S.C. $ 2283 (1982); see also discussion supra part II.A.l.
76. 407 U.S. 225 (1972).
77. Id. a t 236.
78. See Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 711 (1977); Doran v. Salem Inn,
Inc., 422 U.S. 922, 931 (1975); Spielman Motor Co. v. Dodge, 295 U.S. 89, 95
(1935).
79. 401 U.S. 37 (1971).
80. Id. at 38-39.
81. Id.
82. Id. a t 41.
83. See Hicks v. Miranda, 422 U.S. 332, 350-51 (1975); Cameron v. Johnson,
390 U.S. 611, 612 (1968); Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380 U.S. 479, 487-89 (1965).
84. See North Georgia Finishing, Inc. v. Di-Chem, Inc., 419 U.S. 601 (1975);
Watson v. Buck, 313 U.S. 387, 402 (1941); Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 53-54
(1971). But see Trainor v. Hernandez, 431 U.S. 434, 446-47 (1977).
85. See Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103 (1975) (holding that being held in jail
pending trial without judicial determination of probable cause constituted an ex-
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While Younger has its primary application in criminal
cases, the Supreme Court has subsequently expanded the application of Younger's restriction against enjoining pending
state proceedings to civil actions and administrative proceedings involving important state interests?
Younger abstention highlights the traditional notions of
equity, which required the court to refrain from acting if there
existed an adequate remedy of law and if the petitioning party
was not threatened with irreparable injuryg7 The Younger
doctrine also "semes to prevent a multiplicity of suits where a
single action will adequately protect the rights asserted."gg
Possibly most importantly, this judicially-created deferral prevents federal muddling in state proceedings, thus serving the
"vital" interests of comity and "Our Federali~rn."~~
In Younger, the Court highlights these two deciding factors--comity and federalism. The Court defines "Our Federalism" in the following manner:
[a] proper respect for state functions, a recognition of the fact
that the entire country is made up of a Union of separate
state governments, and a continuance of the belief that the
National Government will fare best if the States and their
institutions are left free to perform their separate functions in
their separate ways. This, perhaps for lack of a better and
clearer way to describe it, is referred to by many as "Our
Federalism" . . . .90

The Court proceeds to explain that this concept of "Our Federalism" represents
a system in which there is sensitivity to the legitimate interests of both State and National Governments, and in which
the National Government, anxious though it may be to vindicate and protect federal rights and federal interests, always

traordinary circumstance); Gibson v. Berryhill, 411 U.S. 564 (1973) (finding pecuniary interest of members of Alabama Board of Optometry to be a special circumstance permitting an injunction against the proceeding before the Board).
86. Pennzoil Co. v. Texaco, Inc., 481 U S . 1, 12-14 (1987); Juidice v. Vail, 430
U.S. 327, 335-36 (1977).
87. Younger, 401 U.S. at 43-44.
88. Georgene M. Vairo, Interrelationship of Federal and State Litigation, C842
ALI-ABA 1167, 1174 (1993).
89. Id.
90. Younger, 401 US. at 44.
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endeavors to do so in ways that will not unduly interfere with
the legitimate activities of the state^.^'

The principles of comity and "Our Federalism" obviously dominate the Younger decision.
4. Colorado River abstention

In contrast to the federalism-promoting doctrine of equitable restraint underlying Younger and Burford abstention, and
the policy of avoiding constitutional adjudication supporting
Pullman, the foundation of Colorado Riverg2 abstention is
Colorado River Water Consersound judicial admini~tration.'~
vation District v. United States involved a dispute over water
rights." The United States brought the action in federal court
but was a defendant in a parallel state action over the same
rights.95 The Supreme Court held that "dismissal cannot be
supported under [the] doctrine [of abstention] in any of its
forms" simply because there is a related and parallel action
pending in state court.96In ordering abstention, the Court created an abstention doctrine to be used under exceptional circumstances in the interest of "[wlise judicial administrat i ~ n . " ~The
? Court enumerated the following factors to be considered when deciding whether an exceptional circumstance exist~:~~
1) the first court to assume jurisdiction;
the relative conveniences of the forums;
3) whether there is a high desirability of avoiding piecemeal
litigation;
4) the manner in which jurisdiction was obtained;

2)

91. Id.
92. Colorado River Water Cons. Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S. 800 (1976).
93. Id. at 817.
94. Id. at 804.
95. Id. at 806.
96. Id. at 813; see also Kline v. Burke Constr. Co., 260 U.S. 226, 230 (1922)
("Each court is free to proceed in its own way and in its own time, without reference to the proceedings in the other court."); Stanton v. Embrey, 93 U.S. 548,
554 (1877) ("[Plendency of a prior suit is not a bar to a subsequent suit in a circuit court or in the court below, even though the two suits are for the same cause
of action.").
97. Colorado River, 424 U.S. at 817 (quoting Kerotest Mfg. Co. v. C-0-Two
Fire Equip. Co., 342 U.S. 180, 183 (1952)).
98. Id. at 818-19 ("No one factor is necessarily determinative; a carefully
considered judgment taking into account both the obligation to exercise jurisdiction
and the combination of factors counseling against that exercise is required.").
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the adequacy of the remedies in the respective courts;99
whether federal law governs the action.loO

Despite the exacting examination of these factors and the
narrow construction of Colorado River by the Supreme
Court,'" the circuit and district courts have found numerous
"exceptional circumstance^."''^

5. Propriety of the abstention doctrines
Scholars have argued that the judicially created abstention
doctrines are appropriate limitations on the express grants of
federal jurisdiction on the basis of the history leading to the
passage of such federal jurisdictional statutes.lo3 The brief
analysis of jurisdiction-limiting statutes above1" demonstrates Congress' intent to recognize the background of judicial
abstention when enacting statutes for federal deferral to state
proceedings through restrictions on the exercise of federal jurisdiction. As one commentator argues, the judicially created abstention doctrines are allowed, despite express grants of jurisdiction from Congress, because
these statutes were themselves passed against the background of a large body of standing law on matters of substance, remedy, and jurisdiction. . . . The fact that a given
remedial doctrine is not explicitly mentioned therefore does
not automatically mean that the new statute was intended
wholly to supersede it.lo5

Therefore, when Congress enacted the federal jurisdictional
statutes,lo6 it did so "against a well"lo7 of the courts' equitable discretion to decline jurisdiction when certain compelling
99. Id.
100. This sixth factor is clearly added by Moses H. Cone Memorial Hospital. v.
Mercury Construction Co., 460 US. 1, 24 (1983). There have been additional factors suggested by various commentators, yet the above six are those clearly used
by the Court. See HART & WESCHLER,
supra note 5, at 1451-52.
101. See Hawaii Housing Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 US. 229, 236 (1984); Moses H.
Cone, 460 U.S. at 2; Colorado River, 424 U.S. at 813.
102. For an extensive sampling, see cases cited in Vairo, supra note 88, a t
1179.
103. See Paul M. Bator, The State Courts and Federal Constitutional Litigation, 22 WM. & MARY L. REV. 605 (1981).
104. See discussion supra part II.A.l-3.
105. See Bator, supra note 103, at 622 n.49.
106. See discussion supra part II.A.l-3.
107. To quote a colloquial phrase of Professor C. Douglas Floyd.
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reasons for doing so were present. Congress understood that a
grant of jurisdiction was not a mandate but rather an authorization to hear cases that would not upset the delicate balance
of power within the dual-court system.
Although subject to debate,lo8commentators have argued
that the judicially created abstention doctrines are proper exercises of judicial power since the abstention doctrines are in
harmony with legislatively created abstentions. This conclusion
accords with Professor Bator's view. Although disagreeing with
this line of thinking, Professor Redish describes this view,
which he terms the "implied delegation rationale," in the following manner:
One might argue that federal court jurisdiction . . . contains an implied authority to modifjr or limit the exercise of
that jurisdiction in order to avoid friction within the federal
system. Congress cannot foresee all conceivable federalism
tensions that might arise in specific exercises of federal jurisdiction, the argument would proceed, and therefore it is reasonable to assume that Congress would allow the federal
courts to modify or limit their jurisdiction when they find
such dangers. It is indeed not uncommon for Congress to
provide broad delegations of authority to the federal judiciary
to make law. In Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, for
example, the Supreme Court held that what seemed to be
merely a broad jurisdictional statute vested in the federal
courts the power to develop--wholly without congressional
guidance-a substantive federal common law of labor relations. Similarly, the broad language of section 1 of the
Sherman Act has been construed as an effective delegation of
legislative authority to the judiciary to develop a common law
of restraint of trade. Moreover, the implied delegation argument asserts, if Congress were unhappy with any existing
form of partial abstention, it would legislatively revoke it. The
failure to do so, combined with reenactment of the relevant
substantive and jurisdictional legislation, the argument posits, reveals an implicit congressional acceptance and ratification of such judge-made limitations. log

108. Compare Bator, supra note 103 and David L. Shapiro, Jurisdiction and
Discretion, 60 N.Y.U. L. REV. 543 (1985) and Michael Wells, Why Professor Redish
is Wrong About Abstention, 19 GA. L. REV. 1097 (1985) with Thomas Merrill, The
Common Law Powers of Federal Courts, 52 U. CHI.L. REV.1 (1985) and Redish,
supra note 8.
109. Redish, supra note 8, at 80-81. Professor Redish refers to "partial abstention" as that "abstention [which] leaves intact a portion of the jurisdictional grant"
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Some commentators have argued that allowing the judiciary to form such buffers between the federal and state systems
is wise. As Shapiro points out, there are compelling justifications not only for the existence of the abstention doctrines, but
also for allowing the judiciary to create and enforce them:
[Sluggestions of an overriding obligation [to exercise
jurisdiction], subject only and at most to a few narrowly
drawn exceptions, are far too grudging in their recognition of
judicial discretion in matters of jurisdiction. . . . [Tlhe existence of this discretion is much more pervasive than is generally realized, and . . . it has ancient and honorable roots a t
common law as well as in equity.

... .

. . . My point is not that the Constitution expressly "provides" that a grant of jurisdiction carries with it certain discretion not to proceed, or that Congress necessarily "intends"
to confer such discretion when it authorizes the exercise of
jurisdiction. Rather I submit that, as experience and tradition
teach, the question whether a court must exercise jurisdiction
and resolve a controversy on its merits is difficult, if not impossible, to answer in gross. And the courts are functionally
better adapted to engage in the necessary fine tuning than is
the legislature.
....
. . . A grant of jurisdiction

obligates the court to receive
and consider the plaintiff's complaint and, on appropriate
occasions, to determine whether the ends of justice will be
served best by declining to proceed.
At the same time, nothing in our history or traditions
permits a court to interpret a normal grant of jurisdiction as
conferring unbridled authority to hear cases simply a t its
pleasure. . . . w h e n jurisdiction is conferred, I believe there
is at least a "principle of preference" that a court should entertain and resolve on its merits an action within the scope of
the jurisdictional grant. For this preference to yield in a particular case, the court must provide an explanation based on

in contrast to "total abstention" which "effectively repeal[s] the statutory structure."
Id. at 77, 74. He posits other justifications for partial abstention which are essentially variations on this implied delegation rationale. While admitting that this
rationale is "conceivable,"he rejects it and its corollaries as being "neither theoretically legitimate nor practically realistic" as well as violative of separation-of-powers
ideals. Id. at 78-104; see also Zwickler v. Koota, 389 U.S. 241, 248 (1967) (stating
that when Congress granted statutory jurisdiction it also "imposed the duty upon
all levels of the federal judiciary to give due respect to a suitor's choice of a federal forumn);Merrill, supra note 108.
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the language of the grant, the historical context in which the
grant was made, or the common law tradition behind it."'
Despite deficiencies in the reasons and justifications for
the abstention doctrines, they have been accepted by the Supreme Court, at least tacitly accepted by Congress, and appear
to be here to stay. The policies of promoting comity and federalism while avoiding friction between the federal and state judicial systems have carried the day.

The culmination of nearly a decade of work,"' adoption
by the American Law Institute of the Complex Litigation Recommendation~"~
marks a vast effort to curb the unwieldiness
of complex litigation. The Proposal "establishes new mechanisms and standards for the intra-federal, state-to-federal,
federal-to-state, and state-to-state transfer and consolidation of
related, yet geographically dispersed, actions, and provides a
set of choice-of-law rules for actions that are transferred to a
federal ~ourt.""~
Several areas of the Proposal may have an impact on the
abstention doctrines as discussed above. The focus of this comment is on the powers in the Proposal that are associated with
state-to-federal transfers and Consolidations. The primary powers which will impact the abstention doctrines are those relating to removal and antisuit injunctions. The anticipated impact
rests largely on the fact that most of the cases removed, transferred, or enjoined will be nondiverse, state law actions.

A. Removal Jurisdiction
To ensure the just and efficient resolution of complex cases,
the Proposal proposes transfer and consolidation of actions involving "one or more common questions of fact."'" The

110. Shapiro, supra note 81, a t 543-45, 574-75 (emphasis added).
111. Professor Arthur R. Miller conducted a Preliminary Study on Complex
Litigation in 1985, which effectively began this work, although the Reporters and
the Advisory Committee were not appointed until 1988 and although the First
Tentative Draft was not presented for discussion until May of 1989. See Symeon C.
Symeonides, The ALl's Complex Litigation Project: Commencing the National Debate, 54 LA. L. REV.843, 843 (1994).
112. COMPLEXLITIGATIONPROPOSAL,supra note 2.
113. Symeonides, supra note 111, a t 844.
114. COMPLEXLITIGATION
PROPOSAL,supra note 2, 4 3.01(a)(l).
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Proposal contemplates that the authority to require consolidation will be granted by Congress to a Complex Litigation Panel
through the proposed Complex Litigation Statute. In order to
"foster consolidation and more efficient and fair treatment of
related claims,"115 the Complex Litigation Panel "may order
the removal to federal court and consolidation of one or more
civil actions pending in one or more state courts."'" Before
such removal may occur, however, the Panel
shall evaluate . . . (1)the criteria set forth in $ 3.01 to determine whether the transfer and consolidation of the cases is
warranted and (2) . . . whether removal will unduly disrupt or
impinge upon state court or regulatory proceedings or impose
an undue burden on the federal courts. When making its
determination under subsections (a)(l) and (a)(2), the Complex Litigation Panel should consider factors such as
the amount in controversy for the claims to be removed;
the number and size of the actions involved;
the number of jurisdictions in which the state cases are
lodged;
any special reasons to avoid inconsistency;
the presence of any special local community or state
regulatory interests;
whether removal and consolidation will result in a
change in the applicable law that will cause undue unfairness to the parties; and
the possibility of facilitating informal cooperation or coordination with the state courts in which the cases are
lodged.1'

In order t o prevent removal of the action, all of the parties as
well as the state judge must agree that removal is improper.118
The federalism concerns espoused by the abstention doctrines are implicated, as well as threatened, by this removal
provision. The threat posed by the removal statute looms beyond the protective reach of the abstention doctrines in an area
where federal courts presently lack jurisdiction. Not unwisely,
the Proposal addresses these federalism concerns squarely. The
Proposal states that due to the "important federalism issues"

115.
116.
117.
118.

Id. § 5.01 cmt. a.
Id. § 5.01(a).
Id.
Id. 5 5.01(b).
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raised by section 5.01, "the Panel must be especially sensitive
to federalism concerns suggesting that removal would not be
desirable. Removal may intrude inappropriately on the substantive interests of the state from which the cases are removed. The states always must be respected as politically separate and independent sovereign^.""^ Particularly in the face
of the expanding federal jurisdiction proposed by the Proposal,
these words must be heeded if the delicate state-federal balance is to be maintained.
While not explicitly stating so, the Proposal's comments
espouse the concerns expressed in Burford. The Proposal urges
that
traditional federal respect for state sovereignty argues strongly for state control over cases arising under state law and
respecting local citizens. . . . Similarly, if the activities or
conduct involved fall within specific state regulatory interests
. . . the desire to defer to the state and allow it to complete its
proceedings without federal court interference may caution
strongly against removal.'"

By urging such respect, the Proposal appears to give de facto
support to an "abstention" based on the Burford rationale:
important state interests and policies should be left to the
states when a state regulatory scheme is in place to review
controversies involving such interests. In fact, the Proposal's
endorsement of Burford abstention appears clear from the language of section 5.01(a)(2), which requires the Panel to evaluate "whether removal will unduly disrupt or impinge upon
state court or regulatory proceedings.""'
The Proposal also attempts to force state court filings when
the majority of the related actions have been filed in parallel
state proceeding^.'^^ This is to be accomplished by a stay of
the federal court proceedings until the completion of the state
court proceedings.'" The stay naturally "will have the effect
of coercing the federal parties to file in state court."124Thus,
federalism concerns may be further alleviated.

119.
120.
121.
122.
123.
124.

Id. § 5.01 cmt. c.
Id.
Id. 8 5.01(a)(2).
Id. 8 5.01 cmt. c.
Id.
Id.
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B. Reverse Removal
Mention must be made of an entirely new procedure partly
designed to 'avoid the threats to federalism generated "[wlhen
substantive state interests are at issue" and "all the actions
regardless of where they were filed [are forced] into a consolidated federal court action."125The procedure contemplates a
federal-to-state transfer mechanism through the enactment of a
federal statute and state-to-state transfer through an interstate
compact or uniform act. 126
This reverse removal will occur only under very limited
circumstances and only after the requirements for federal
transfer are satisfied as a threshold matter.127Many federalism concerns raised by these state transfer mechanisms, including concerns about federal imposition on state judicial
independence and overburdening of state dockets, may be alleviated by the fact that the consent of the appropriate state judicial authority must be obtained prior to cons~lidation.'~~
The state transfer section of the Proposal will provide an
opportunity for actions with overwhelming state issues, interests, and litigants to have their day in state court. Because the
factors allowing for state court consolidation are so demanding,
however, consolidation in a state court will occur in only a
small number of cases, cases in which state issues predominate. Thus, federalism interests will be protected by the state
transfer section only in relatively few cases. Also, however
apparent the appeasement of federalism policies may appear in
the state transfer provision, the provision's overriding aim "is
to increase the ability to promote efficient aggregated proceedings."I2'
The demanding nature of the factors in the state transfer
section are too high to permit the substantive and quantitative
results necessary to protect the principles of federalism. As the
principles of federalism underlying the abstention doctrines are
eroded by the Proposal, even in a piecemeal fashion, the threat
to the abstention doctrines increases.

125.
126.
127.
128.
129.

Id. Ch. 4 Intro. Note cmt. b.
Id. crnt. a.
See id. 8 4.01.
Id. 8 4.01(a), cmt. b.; Ch. 4 Intro. Note cmt. d.
Id. Ch. 4 Intro. Note cmt. a.
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C. Antisuit Injunctions
Another aspect of the power to consolidate actions is the
ability to enjoin related proceedings in other courts. This power
is found in section 5.04, Antisuit Injunctions:
(a) When actions are transferred and consolidated pursuant to 5 3.01 or 5 5.01, the transferee court may
enjoin transactionally related proceedings, or portions thereof, pending in any state or federal court
whenever it determines that the continuation of
those actions substantially impairs or interferes
with the consolidated actions and that an injunction
would promote the just, efficient, and fair resolution
of the actions before it.
(b) Factors t o be considered in deciding whether an injunction should issue under subsection (a) include
(1) how far the actions to be enjoined have progressed;
(2) the degree to which the actions to be enjoined
share common questions with and are
duplicative of the consolidated actions;
(3) the extent to which the actions to be enjoined
involve issues or claims of federal law; and
(4) whether parties to the action to be enjoined
were permitted to exclude themselves from the
consolidated proceeding under 5 3.O5(a) or
5 5.01(b).130

This injunctive power is a necessary and logical aspect of
the efficiency theme permeating the Proposal. The power is a
crucial component of the broad managerial powers granted to
the transferee judge to further the objective of achieving a just,
efficient, and fair adjudication of the dispute.131 Without the
power to enjoin related proceedings the transferee court would
be fettered with peripheral matters hindering the advancement
of the consolidated actions.
The Proposal recognizes the serious federalism concerns
raised by the injunctive power.'" In addressing these concerns, the Proposal initially focuses on the fact that the legislative body will confer the power to enjoin state proceedings and
that the first exception of the Anti-Injunction Act allows such
130. Id. 8 5.04.
131. Id. 8 3.06.
132. Id. 8 5.04 cmt. c.
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injunctions based on express congressional auth~rization.'~~
Thus, the Proposal implies that the proposed federal injunctive
power is consistent with, and does not upset, the current federal-state balance struck by the legislature in the Anti-Injunction
Act. With the passage of the Complex Litigation Statute, the
doorway will be opened for injunctions of state court proceedings because of the express exception it contains.
In apparent deference to federalism concerns, the Proposal
also suggests that the injunction, if issued, "should be as narThe Proposal emphasizes state interests,
row as p~ssible."'~~
declaring that "[b]ecause of the serious intrusion caused by an
antisuit injunction both on party interests and, when state
court litigation is involved, on state interests, the scope of the
injunction must be limited to what is necessary to meet the
standards of 5 5.04(a)."'~~
A narrow injunction, such as one
focusing only on discovery, for example, may be appropriate
where "[aln injunction against all activity in the related action
~ ~ narrowing the injunction in
would not be ~ a r r a n t e d . " ' In
this manner, the Proposal contends that the purposes of the
Proposal will be advanced without damaging federalism
interest~.'~~
In this same vein, the Proposal urges that "because an injunction sometimes will implicate sensitive issues of state sovereignty, and always will impinge on the parties' abilities to
control their litigation, it should not issue unless the fullest
due process safeguards have been provided."138 According to
the Proposal, these due process safeguards, such as "a detailed
factual inquiry and a full opportunity for all affected parties to
be heard,"13' will ensure the recognition and consideration of
federalism issues before the injunction is issued.

133.
134.
135.
136.
137.
138.
139.

28 U.S.C.5 2283 (1982);see also discussion supra part II.A.l.
COMPLEXLITIGATION
PROPOSAL,
supra note 2, 5 5.04 cmt. a.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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LITIGATION
PROJECT
AND THE
IV. THECOMPLEX
ABSTENTION
DOCTRINES:
A FORKED
TONGUE-THE DUAL
TREATMENT
REVEALED
In harmony with their expressed concern over federalism,
the Proposal mentions the importance of the abstention doctrines. The Proposal addresses the abstention doctrines with
particularity in comment d of section 5.01:
The expansion of federal removal jurisdiction under

5 5.01 to accommodate complex cases also is tailored to take
account of general federalism concerns. Historically, as a
matter of comity and federalism, federal courts have declined
to exercise jurisdiction over certain cases deemed more appropriate for state court adjudication. Although the scope of
abstention doctrines is uncertain, it generally reflects an
exercise of judicial self-restraint motivated by a desire to
avoid undue intrusion in matters properly within state competence. However, when Congress explicitly grants removal
jurisdiction in order to provide an economical and fair forum
for multiparty, multiforum disputes, it expresses a federal
interest in these cases. To the extent that this expansion of
removal jurisdiction might be viewed as undermining the
states' traditional role in defining their own substantive
law-particularly tort law-that prerogative is not constitutionally immune. Removal under this section fits within the
scope of Article I11 jurisdiction and also may be justified a s an
exercise of Congress's Article I interstate commerce powers.140

Ultimately, especially when combined with other passages of
the proposal, this paragraph sends a dual message that undermines the ideals of federalism found in the abstention doctrines.

A. State versus Federal Interests
The paragraph quoted above begins by stating that section
5.01 has been "tailored to take account of general federalism
~oncerns."'~'This is in harmony with the lipservice of comment c and the first several paragraphs of comment d. Then a
"however" creeps into the paragraph, followed by justifications
that overshadow the earlier language and message. In essence,

140. Id. $ 5.01 cmt. d.
141. Id.
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the Proposal contends that a matter is no longer of state interest when Congress deems the matter within its own interests.
The judicially created abstention doctrines completely r e k t e
this assertion by refusing to exercise jurisdiction over matters
that Congress has expressly placed within the jurisdiction of
the federal courts. The Proposal strongly implies that once the
Complex Litigation Statute is enacted by Congress the federalism concerns and the policies underlying the abstention doctrines fade to the background.
Further seeking to stifle federalism concerns, comment d
continues by stating that such concerns "act as an important
element in deciding whether a particular grouping of cases
could be handled better in the federal or the state courts," but
they are "not an absolute barrier."142It is doubtful that federalism concerns or the abstention doctrines would ever be
viewed as an absolute barrier. However, when treated as mere
factors by a proposal which also tries to emphasize their importance, federalism principles are ultimately undermined. As
seen below, the placating words ring hollow when the procedures for application are proposed.

B. Federalism on a PedestallFederalism in a Slough: The
Dualistic Treatment of the Abstention Doctrines
The abstention doctrines are heralded in one breath by the
Proposal and then subverted in the next. The heralding of federalism principles can also be seen in the treatment of the
abstention doctrines in relation to the antisuit injunctions.
Subsection (b)(3) of section 5.04 deals with the federalism concerns directly, stating that the court should consider "the extent to which the actions to be enjoined involve issues or claims
of federal law."143
The abstention doctrines are particularly addressed in the
comment on the discretionary factors listed above under section
5.04(b)(l)-(4).lMThe comment to this section requires "the
transferee judge to consider whether the actions to be enjoined
involve issues or claims of federal law."145 The comment
emphasizes the importance of federalism, specifically mention-

142.
143.
144.
145.

Id. § 5.01 cmt. d.
Id. 5 5.04(b)(3).
See supra text accompanying note 130.
COMPLEXLITIGATION PROPOSAL, supra note 2, 8 5.04 cmt. d.
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ing the embodiment of federalism concerns in the abstention
doctrines:
A transferee judge deciding to enjoin state litigation involving
predominantly state issues must respect traditional notions of
federalism, especially as reflected in the various abstention
doctrines. See Comment c, Reporter's Note 9. Although some
federal intrusion on state court proceedings may be necessary
to effectuate a solution to the complex litigation problem,
great care must be taken to preserve the federal-state balance
of power. Before deciding to enjoin a state court proceeding, a
federal transferee judge must weigh the benefits of aggregation against the potential intrusion on state sovereignty. The
greater the significance of the federal claims or issues involved in the action to be enjoined, the more reasonable it will
be to issue the injunction because it would not be unduly
intrusive on legitimate state interests. Any intrusiveness
would be on the litigation and party interests, which should
not be overlooked, but are evaluated under subsections (b)(l)
and (b)(4). Conversely, if a case is dominated by state-based
claims or issues, enjoining their prosecution in a state court
should require a strong finding that the benefits of consolidation in the transferee court would be undermined by allowing
that state suit to continue unimpeded. This might be true, for
example, if the court found that a particular state action
essentially was parallel to one of those in the consolidated
proceeding or that the plaintiffs had filed it after the Complex
Litigation Panel had issued its order to transfer and consolidate in an effort to engage in a race to judgment or to avoid
the governing law chosen under the applicable federal choice
of law standards. See generally Chapter 6 . In the latter event,
an injunction may be necessary to ensure the consistent application of the law chosen by the transferee court.146

This aspect of the comment dealing specifically with federalism concerns appears to placate any fears one may have
regarding the disregard or dismissal of such concerns. The
Proposal compels the transferee judge to "respect traditional
notions of federalism"; the judge "must" do so.147 The
Proposal demands, with particularity, that the judge examine
these "traditional notions of federalism . . . as reflected in the
various abstention do~trines."'~~
The judge is told that while
146. Id.
147. Id.
148. Id.
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"some federal intrusion" may be required to solve the complex
litigation problem, "great care must be taken" to uphold the
delicate federal-state balance of power.'41 The scales are to
weigh "the benefits of aggregation" on the one side, "potential
intrusion on state sovereignty" on the other.'" The transferee
judge is told that in a case "dominated by state-based claims or
issues, . . . a strong finding" is "require[d]" that "the benefits of
consolidation in the transferee court would be undermined by
allowing that state suit to continue unimpeded" before enjoining its prosecution in the state court. Taken in isolation, this
paragraph of comment d would go far to alleviate the concerns
over the Proposal's treatment of federalism concerns embodied
in the abstention doctrines.
However, when read in conjunction with other language of
the Proposal, with other treatment of the abstention doctrines,
and with the dominating theme of the Proposal, an entirely
different impression emerges: the "efficiency" card trumps all
others, including the abstention card of the federalism suit.
Under this efficiency dominated impression, the Panel and the
transferee judge will play their hands.
For example, the Proposal does not pause for a moment before dismissing the federalism concerns raised by creating another exception to the general prohibition against federal injunctions of state a c t i o n ~ . ' The
~ ~ message to Congress, and
indirectly to the Panel and transferee judge, is that "[tlhe federalism concerns articulated in various abstention doctrines are
merely prudential. They are binding on the courts by operation
of stare decisis, but they do not delimit Congress's ability to
regulate the federal courts."'52 This wording discourages the
use of the abstention doctrines and is in great contrast to the
mandatory-sounding language used above requiring the examination of and heed to the abstention doctrines. The
Recommendaitons' inconsistent treatment of the abstention
doctrines sends a mixed message to the transferee judge, with
the ultimate effect of down-playing the importance of the abstention doctrines and federalism concerns in general. "One
cannot but see such ambivalence as de-emphasizing the legitimate federalism-based role of abstention while stressing the

149.
150.
151.
152.

Id.

Id.
Id. $ 5.04.
Id. $ 5.04 cmt. c (emphasis added).
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virtually unchecked exercise of discretion to issue injunctive
orders.

C. Dismissal of Traditional State Respect
A larger problem becomes evident &om such cursory treatment of the federalism concerns embodied in the abstention
doctrines: the lack of respect given by the Proposal to state
sovereignty. Congress, and arguably the federal courts, have
traditionally respected state sovereignty to a much greater
degree than the Proposal does. The Anti-Injunction Act, the
Tax Injunction Act, and the Johnson Act are examples of congressional attempts to limit federal court power and jurisdiction in order to prevent serious infringement on state sovereignty. These and other acts of Congress indicate that the abstention policies are not only a matter of judicial, but also of
legislative, concern.
The legislative respect of state sovereignty has been f i r thered by the federal courts through narrow constructions of
the exceptions to these statutes1" and through the restraints
found in the abstention doctrines. When congressional and judicial respect for state sovereignty are juxtaposed with the respect espoused by the Proposal, the latter pales in comparison.
By emphasizing the "merely prudential" aspect of the abstention doctrines over the federalism concerns underlying the
doctrines, the Proposal seeks to justify their override of the
Anti-Injunction Act.lS5 They "press" the abstention theory into a new mold while simultaneously giving lip-service to the
federalism concerns underlying the statute.156 Turning abstention theory "on its head," the Proposal uses it "to serve the
ends of federalized, consolidated proceeding^."'^^ Professor

153. Edward Brunet, The Triumph of Efficiency and Discretion Over Competing
Complex Litigation Policies, 10 REV. LITIG. 273, 290 (1991).
154. California v. Grace Brethren Church, 457 U.S. 393, 413 (1982) (stating
that the "exception" to the Tax Injunction Act should be narrowly construed);
Mitchum v. Foster, 407 U.S. 225, 228-29 (1972) (holding, along with Atlantic Coast
Line, that the Anti-Injunction Act's ban is absolute unless the case falls within one
of the three express exceptions); Atlantic Coast Line R.R. v. Brotherhood of Locomotive Eng'rs, 398 U.S. 281, 286-87 (1970); Stanislaus Food Prods. Co. v. Public
Util. Comm'n, 560 F. Supp. 114 (N.D.Cal. 1982) (finding no exception to the Johnson Act for suits under 42 U.S.C. § 1983).
155. Linda S. Mullenix, Complex Litigation Reform and Article III Jurisdiction,
L. REV. 169, 213 (1990).
59 FORDHAM
156. Id.
157. Id.
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Mullenix is very critical of this twist on the abstention doctrines and their underlying policies:
Thus, the reformers use abstention theory, which has
traditionally been interpreted to permit federal court abdication of jurisdiction in favor of parallel state court proceedings,
to justifj. the denial of state court jurisdiction over complex
cases. Rather than using abstention doctrine to restrict the
exercise of federal jurisdiction, the reformers press abstention
theory into service to expand federal jurisdiction. This is reverse mandatory abstention, and how this serves the ends of
federalism and comity is unclear.158

D. Efficiency Trumps Federalism
By treating the abstention doctrines as "merely prudential"
and thus moving away from federalism, the Proposal joins
voices with those advocating efficiency over federalism.lsg
Judge Weinstein's voice is heard in the injunctions preventing
all federal and state litigation against two asbestos producers
in In re Joint Eastern and Southern Districts Asbestos
LitigationlGOand In re Eagle-Picher Industries, Inc.161 Judge
Weinstein's decision in enjoining these actions "illustrates how
the interests of judicial administration can overwhelm competing policies in a balancing test."lG2Such an efficiency emphasis occurs throughout the Proposal and most definitely appears
to weigh more heavily in the balance than do other policies and
considerations.lG3
The efficiency trend also carries over into the choice of law
provisions of the Proposal with the same effect of giving lip
158. Id.
159. Some have resigned themselves to this trend as a necessary evil. See
Herbert P. Wilkins, The ALJ's Complex Litigation Project: A State Judge's View,54
LA. L. REV. 1155, 1158 (1994) (stating that "[als a state judge, I have no problem
with the fact that the operation of the proposed system will result in cases being
taken away fiom state court jurisdiction on a standard of freer mobility . . . . That
will be the inevitable and necessary consequence of the efficient transfer and consolidation of cases by the complex litigation panel").
160. 120 B.R. 648 (E. & S.D.N.Y. 1990).
161. 134 F.R.D. 32 (E. & S.D.N.Y. 1990).
162. Brunet, supra note 153, a t 289.
163. See id. a t 290-97 (discussing "recent clashes between efficiency and fairness-premised policies [which] have frequently advanced efficiency while merely
accommodating or clearly subordinating fairness"); see also COMPLEX LITIGATION
PROPOSAL,supra note 2, 8 5.01 cmt. d (employing a circular argument justifying
intrusion on parties' rights based on an earlier aspect of the Proposal).
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service to state interests while in reality undermining those
interests. In the introduction to chapter six, the Proposal states
that there were two important considerations weighed in deciding "what choice of law system would be most compatible with
the objectives" of the Proposal? These considerations were
"whether there is sufficient justification to change the current
reliance on state choice of law rules, since any adoption of a
federal statutory choice of law code for complex litigation necessarily will intrude on what has been an area governed by
state law" and
[ilf a federal statutory approach is thought desirable, . . .
whether that approach simply should authorize the federal
courts to develop federal common law in the area . . . or
whether more precise rules ought to be provided giving greater guidance to the judiciary concerning how to select among
competing state interests in providing the controlling legal
principles.16'

The Proposal predictably chose to "intrude on what has
been an area governed by state law" and authorize federally
mandated choice of law? One commentator feels that this is
simply "another assault on state sovereignty":
State sovereignty is a fbndamental element of the American constitutional system. The ability of each state to apply
its own law in private litigation where it has a real interest
in doing so in order to implement the policy reflected in that
law is an important attribute of state sovereignty. The regard
for state sovereignty, that is so fundamental in our constitutional system and that has been so long recognized by Congress, strongly argues against denying the states the power to
apply their own law to advance their own policies and interests, notwithstanding that a mass tort is inv~lved.'~'

After taking this first step of authorizing a federal choice
of law rule, the Proposal attempts to soften the blow through
"ritual incantations" to the states concerning their rights. The
blow is further softened through articulated, but of little ap-

164. COMPLEX
LITIGATION PROPOSAL,
supra note 2, Ch. 6 Intro. Note.
165. Id.
166. Id.; see id. $8 6.01, 6.03.
167. Robert A. Sedler, The Complex Litigation Project's Proposal for FederallyMandated Choice of Law in Mass Torts Cases: Another Assault on State Sovereignty, 54 LA. L. REV. 1085, 1110 (1994).
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parent sincerity, federalism concerns which prevent the Proposal from allowing the federal courts to develop their own federal
common law in the area due to "states' rights,"'68 federalism
"con~erns"'~~
and restraint^,"'^^ "state interest^,"'^' and
the existence of a "vigorous body of state law."172 While the
Proposal dismisses the choice of law rules established by the
states, they a t least permit the application of state substantive
law.lT3This may be the only "real" triumph for federalism.
Once again, conflicting signals are expressed as lip-service is
given to federalism while state choice of law rules are thrown
out the window. The ultimate result is undermining federalism
and, necessarily, the policies underlying the abstention doctrines.

The abstention doctrines were created in a dual system of
judiciaries in an effort to prevent friction. They were also treated in harmony with statutes demanding federal deferral to
state courts and against the federal courts' well-established
equitable discretion to decline jurisdiction when certain compelling reasons for doing so are present. Although Congress has
created exceptions to these statutes, they have been few in
number and narrowly construed by the courts. This indicates
the importance of the comity and respect due the state system
from the federal system as well as the importance of reducing
friction between the two systems.
T h e a b s t e n t i o n doctrines h a v e expanded t h i s
congressionally created deference to state courts for several
reasons. Pullman abstention seeks not only to avoid federal
constitutional issues but also to allow the state courts to settle
uncertainties of state laws. The Court justified Pullman's restraint of federal authority "because of 'scrupulous regard for
the rightful independence of the state governments' and for the
smooth working of the federal judiciary" by avoiding friction
with the state judiciary.'74 Burford abstention seeks to allow
COMPLEX
LITIGATION
PROPOSAL,
supra note 2, Ch. 6 Intro. Note, cmt. c.
Id. Q 6.01, Reporter's Note 4 to cmt. a.
Id. Q 6.01, cmt. c.
Id.
Id. Ch. 6, Intro. Note, Reporter's Note 4 to cmt. b; see Friedrich K.
The Complex Litigation Project's Tort Choice-of-Law Rules, 54 LA. L. REV.
(1994).
Id. Q § 6.01(a), 6.03(a).
Railroad Comm'n v. Pullman Co., 312 U.S.496, 501 (1941) (citations omit-
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the state courts to handle issues involving important local interests when the states have a scheme of public administration
in place to deal with these interests. Younger abstention often
applies to prevent enjoining state proceedings, even when Congress expressly permits an injunction. This type of Younger abstention highlights the traditional notions of equity in the vital
interests of comity and "Our Federalism." Colorado River abstention requires deference to state courts when exceptional
circumstances exist that make abstention administratively
wise.
The interests underlying the abstention doctrines obviously
play an important role in maintaining the delicate balance
between federal and state judiciaries. The Proposal appears to
understand the important roles these policies have played in
our nation's jurisprudence, for the Proposal pays token homage
to these principles. The Proposal employs all the right
catchphrases when entering areas which may raise federalism
concerns, especially those areas espoused by the abstention
doctrines. The Proposal begins by stating that "every attempt
has been made to ensure that the proposals recommended by
the Project are consistent with . . . [the] basic principles of
federalism and their implications as to the respective roles of
state and federal courts."175The Proposal mandates "respect
[for] traditional notions of federalism, especially as reflected in
the various abstention doctrines" and attention to "the fullest
due process safeguards" before issuing an antisuit injunction.'" If the transferee judge decides that an injunction
should issue, "great care must be taken" not to offend the balance of federal-state power and a "strong finding" is "require[dIn that an injunction is necessary to prevent an underSimilar pro-federalism
mining of the consolidated a~ti0ns.l'~
language is employed when dismissing the prospect of allowing
the federal courts to create common law choice of law rules:
"states' rights,"17' federalism "concerns"17g and "re-

ted).
175.
176.
177.
178.
179.

LITIGATION PROPOSAL,
supra note 2, Ch. 1, Intro. Note.
COMPLEX
Id. $ 5.04.
Id.
Id. Ch. 6, Intro. Note, cmt. c.
Id. $ 6.01, Reporter's Note 4 to cmt. a.

994

BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [I995

s t r a i n t ~ , " '"state
~ ~ interests,"lal and the existence of a "vigorous body of state law."lg2
The lessons intended by Arthur Miller the playwright appear to be lost on Arthur Miller the law professor. Like Willy
Loman, the Proposal simultaneously speaks words of contradiction. The above "ritual incantation^,"'^^ intended to assuage,
fail to truly protect federalist principles when viewed with
other language addressing federalism in general and the abstention doctrines in particular. For example, the abstention
doctrines are summarily dismissed as "merely prudential" in
the context of Congress's ability to regulate the federal courts;
they are not immune from constitutional and congressional
attacks, nor are they an "absolute barrier" to congressional
action. This treatment of the abstention doctrines undermines
the policies behind the existing federal abstention statutes, the
equitable constraints pre-dating those statutes, and the important comity and federalism issues underlying the judicial abstention doctrines.
The message sent to the Complex Litigation Panel regarding traditional federalism policies is mixed, yet the substantive
emphasis is placed upon efficiency with the federalism policies
being relegated to the position of secondary considerations.
Acting upon the Proposal's emphasis, the Panel will likely
consolidate and transfer many actions which have traditionally
been left to the states. Additionally, the transferee judge will
likely follow the Panel's lead and more freely issue antisuit
injunctions. As the lubricating policies underlying the abstention doctrines are drained away, the friction so often mentioned
in the abstention cases between the federal and state systems
is bound to follow.
Under the Proposal, then, federalism principles are a casualty to the overriding goal of efficiency.'" The price to be paid
by the abstention doctrines, and in reality by the states, will be
great if the Complex Litigation Statute is adopted. Concerns
over manageability and economy, in the name of efficiency, will
outweigh historic federalism concerns. With the minimization

180. Id. $ 6.01, cmt. c.
181. Id.
182. Id. Ch. 6, Intro. Note, Reporter's Note 4 to cmt. b.
183. Juenger, supra note 172, at 922.
184. For other such casualties, such as party autonomy, party interests, and
choice of forum (to name but a few), see Brunet, supra note 153.
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of state interests, the delicate federal-state balance is disrupted, and the abstention doctrines are in danger of becoming
relics of the past. These developments will likely first occur in
the area of complex litigation, and then as courts create analogies to the complex litigation area, they may slowly move away
from the "merely prudential" abstention doctrines in areas
where the doctrines have traditionally held sway.
Of course, this may be too ominous a prediction. Federal
judges who value state rights and "Our Federalism" may heed
what this comment has characterized as the Proposal's "ritual
incantations." These judges may very well take great care to
preserve the delicate federal-state balance. Especially in the
area of removal jurisdiction, the Complex Litigation Panel may
focus on the language highlighting federalism concerns and the
abstention doctrines, resulting in many cases being adjudicated
by state courts. Burford abstention in particular may thrive in
cases involving the Recomrnendaitons' removal jurisdiction.
There may even be a new form of abstention developed by the
Court in this complex litigation area.
While all the ripples from the Proposal's stone are yet to be
seen and felt, caution must be exercised to avoid friction between our two judicial systems. A developing pattern of valuing
efficiency while subverting federalism appears to be a warning
signal. Before adopting the Proposal's, careful thought and
examination must be devoted to ensure that the ripples do not
become waves eroding the historic shores of the abstention
doctrines on the continent of "Our Federalism."
William A. Calhoun II

